3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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activities of outsiders; Haiti has experienced few such increments, even as a result of the United States occupation. Its citizens cannot readily migrate anywhere; its educational system cannot prepare its people adequately for the modern world; its civil service has proved neither stable nor reliable; its labor force has limited experience with the factory system; and even two decades of active North American intervention did nothing to remake the economic and political structure of the nation. In more recent years, some of the "development projects" foisted on the people of a sovereign Haiti by foreigners working with Haitian officials would not have been tolerated by the colonial representatives of any foreign power obligated to report its activities before the United Nations Trusteeship Council. In view of these things, one is tempted to claim that Haiti has suffered from all the disadvantages of political sovereignty while enjoying none of its advantages.

Unlike those colonial dependencies that were able, over time, to develop internal political ideologies through which to face the pressures imposed by the colonial powers, Haiti was tested by hardly any challenge but its own lack of development. In this sense only can it be said that the freedom Haiti had won in an incredible revolution against powerful enemies came to be a punishment. The struggle brought the Haitian people justified admiration in many quarters, but its price has been isolation and virtual abandonment.

It was the United States occupation that made a lie of Haitian sovereignty, and even of the invincibility of its people. The Haitian "bandits," variously estimated to have numbered from 2,000 to 6,000, who died in what is probably best described as a war of resistance against the North Americans, were barely able to maintain even a brief local conflict against several well-armed companies of United States Marines. Yet that occupation gave Haiti little in return for its denial of the claim of national sovereignty. The public works and reform programs instituted by the United States, designed to give the country roads, schools, hospitals, a disciplined army, a "legitimate" government, and a schooled civil service, hardly endured longer than the occupation itself, since nothing had been done to transform the social and economic base of the society. Within a decade of the North American withdrawal, the gleaming superstructure the occupation created had begun to decay. The major effect of North Amer-